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While the Court does not dispute that at first blush the defendant's
argument appears logical, it is disturbed by the prospect of how
one determines the point at which the number of aggravating
circumstances causes the death penalty statute to be generally
unconstitutional. Is the Court to engage in some mathematical
calculation as to who might be covered by the statute and who is
not; and if so, what would be reasonable and logical factors to
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include in the formula? Can the Court arbitrarily declare that fifty
aggravating circumstances is too many but forty-nine is permissible?
Even assuming one could create a tool that would measure the
percentage of defendants eligible for capital punishment, where is
the dividing line of constitutionality and who makes that decision? 1
INTRODUCTION

In order to use the death penalty, states must have "genuinely
narrowed" 2 the class of people eligible for death to the so-called "worst
of the worst." 3 To do this (in a strategy blessed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its Gregg+ and Jureh 5 cases), juries must find certain
"aggravating factors" that ostensibly prove that this crime and this
criminal were among the offenders most deserving of death. 6 Death
penalty opponents have developed two strategies, one old and one
relatively recent, to attack the various aggravating factors employed by
the states. The first strategy requires showing that some aggravating
factors are so wide-open and amorphous that they do not genuinely
limit who can get the death penalty. For example, factors like a
murder being "inhumane" or "depraved" do not narrow the class of
murderers eligible for the death penalty because arguably all murders
1 State v. Steckel, 708 A.2d 994, 1000 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996); see also Chelsea Creo
Sharon, Note, The "Most Deserving" of Deatl1: The Narrowing Requirement and the
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 223, 239-42 (2011).
1 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("To avoid this constitutional flaw,
an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.").
3 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter,]., dissenting) ("[W]ithin
the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for 'the worst of the
worst."'); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47, as modified (Oct. 1,
2008), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008) ("The rule of evolving
standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature
judgment means that resort to the penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes
and limited in its instances of application.").
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
s Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
6 See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270 (approving statutory scheme that "in essence"
required "the jury [to] find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance
before the death penalty may be imposed"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (approving a
system of aggravating circumstances, which "require[d] the jury to consider the
circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence").
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are inhumane and depraved.7 In the Godfrey case, the Court endorsed
this strategy and required states to put limiting construction on these
overbroad aggravating factors. 8
According to the more recent - and high-profile 9 - strategy, death
penalty abolitionists argue that a single overly broad aggravating factor
could also be present when a state has too many aggravating factors. 10
This argument was set forth in the recent petition for the writ of
certiorari in Hidalgo v. Aiizona. 11 Arizona has fourteen aggravating
7 This objection was raised in the Gregg litigation, but the Court deferred
consideration of it. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (finding "no reason" to assume the
Georgia Supreme Court would adopt "open-ended" constructions of certain
aggravating factors). But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (faulting
the Georgia Supreme Court for not giving a limiting construction to a sentencing
factor that found aggravation if the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible and inhuman" or showed "depravity of mind").
B See id. The general rule for these types of cases was summarized by the Court in
Walton v. Arizona:
When a federal court is asked to review a state court's application of an
individual statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance in a particular
case, it must first determine whether the statutory language defining the
circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer. If
so, then the federal court must attempt to determine whether the state courts
have further defined the vague terms, and if they have done so, whether
those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide
some guidance to the sentencer.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,654 (1990) (emphasis in original).
9 See Chris Geidner, A Top Lawyer Has Aslied the Supreme Court to Hear a Major
Death Penalty Case, BuzzFEED NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 6:10 AM), www.buzzfeed.com/
chrisgeidner/a-top-lawyer-asks-the-supreme-court-to-hear-a-case-to-end (noting Neal
Katyal's role in the Hidalgo cert. petition); see also Charles Fain Lehman, Former Obama
Acting Solicitor General Files SCOTUS Challenge to Death Penalty Constitutionality, WASH.
FREE BEACON (Aug. 16, 2017, 2:30 PM), www.freebeacon.com/issues/fonner-obamasolicitor-general-scotus-challenge-death-penalty (same); Ryan Lovelace, Former Obama
Attorney Asks Supreme Court to Hear New Death Penalty Challenge, WASH. EXAMINER
(Aug. 15, 2017, 11:36 AM), www.washingtonexaminer.com/fonner-obama-attorneyasks-supreme-court-to-hear-new-death-penalty-challenge/article-2631552 (same). Several
amici have already submitted in support of the Hidalgo petition. See Hidalgo v. Arizona,
Pending Petition, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hidalgo-v-arizona
(accessed Sept. 22, 2017).
10 Although not the precise argument advanced in Hidalgo, the strategy was also hinted
at in an important law review note from 2011. See Sharon, supra note 1, at 242-45.
11 See id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251
(U.S. Aug. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 3531089 (U.S.) [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of
Cert.). For the Arizona Supreme Court's decision, see Arizona v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d
783 (2017).
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factors 12 and, what is more important, almost every murder in Arizona
involves one or more of the fourteen aggravating factors. 13 The
petitioners contend that the aggravating factors taken as a whole
cannot serve any narrowing function in limiting the class of those who
are eligible for the death penalty.14 In other words, having too many
aggravating factors can be as ineffective as having no aggravating
factors or having a vague and amorphous aggravating factor. If
everyone who commits murder becomes eligible, the process fails to
select the very worst among the generic class of murderers for the
death penalty. 15 If everyone is the worst, given the scheme as a whole,
then no one really is.
While the argument in the Hidalgo petition is superficially
appealing, it involves a basic mistake. The petition confuses the
empirical scope of a set of aggravators with the conceptual scope. The
empirical scope of a set of aggravators covers the total number of
murders actually committed that fall under one of the aggravators. But
the conceptual scope goes to how many murders in principle are
covered under a set of aggravators. The Court's death penalty
jurisprudence, on my understanding, requires conceptual but not
empirical narrowing. For the fact that a list of aggravating factors may
fit every murder committed in a state for a given time period does not
mean that the aggravating factors are not doing any narrowing work.
After all, a state could have one very specific aggravating factor that fit
all of the murders in that state for that year. Yet this does not allow us
to conclude that the aggravating factor fails to limit in principle the
class of those that are death penalty eligible. What is required is not
just an empirical check on who is getting the death penalty given the
aggravating factors (which is what the Hidalgo petition primarily relies
on) but an actual conceptual investigation of the particular
aggravating factors. But then, we are back to the first strategy - attack
12 See ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-751(F) (2017).
13 Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 3 ('"[V]irtually every' person around 99% - convicted of first-degree murder is eligible for the death penalty."); id.
at 7 (« In other words, 99% of first-degree murders [in Arizona] were eligible for the
death penalty."); see also id. at 6 ("In support of his motion, Hidalgo submitted
evidence demonstrating that virtually every first-degree murder committed in 2010 or
2011 in Maricopa County - where he was tried - had at least one aggravating factor
present.").
14 See id. at 10-12.
1s See id. at 12 ("Petitioner in this case set out evidence demonstrating that the
aggravating circumstances serve no narrowing function at all because 'virtually every
first-degree murder case in Arizona presents facts that could support at least one of
the legislature's aggravating circumstances."').
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certain aggravating factors as too broad based on what murders they
conceptually cover.
My paper proceeds in three short parts. The first part sets out the
argument in the Hidalgo petition and explains its claim that having too
many aggravating factors is as ineffective as having no aggravating
factors. The second part provides a straightforward critique of the
Hidalgo argument along the lines detailed above - that the fact that
aggravating factors may cover a large number of actual murders does
not say much (indeed, practically nothing in the abstract) about
whether those aggravating factors "narrow" the class of the death
eligible. In the third part, I suggest that the "multiple aggravators"
argument is in essence a version of the original worry about broad and
amorphous aggravating factors. But this critique means analyzing how
aggravators work (individually and together) as a conceptual matter,
rather than analyzing whether all murders committed in the state
happen to fit under one of the aggravating factors.
I.

THE ARGUMENT IN THE HIDALGO CERT. PETITION

Appreciating the intuitive force of the argument in the Hidalgo
petition means looking back to both Furman and Gregg: Furman to
appreciate the nature of the problem of arbitrariness and Gregg to
determine what the Supreme Court at the time thought was an
adequate response to the arbitrariness problem. Furman, 16 especially
the concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, 17 pointed to what several
Justices saw as a fundamental flaw in the death penalty in America it failed to adequately pick out who, among those who committed
serious crimes, should receive the death penalty. 18 To be sure, the
problem at the time of Furman was fairly acute. In the 1970s, the
death penalty could be given for rapists, for minor participants in
felony murders, and even for burglars. Moreover, those under sixteen
years old and the seriously mentally disabled were also death
eligible. 19 Accordingly, a burglar who was seventeen on one hand and
16

11
18

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

See id. at 306-10.
See id. at 309-10 ("For, of all the people convicted ofrapes and murders in 1967

and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed.") (footnote omitted).
19 See Carol S. Steiker &: Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI Concerning
Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 376 (2010) ("[T)he Supreme Court . . . has
limited capital punishment to the crime of murder, in comparison to the preFurman world in which death sentences for rape, armed robbery, burglary and
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an adult mass murderer on the other hand could be among the class of
the death eligible. The former could get death while the latter could
get life, all based on nothing more than the jury's untutored sense of
who was "worse." Justice Stewart and others found this possibility
intolerable because this left the selection process for the death penalty
(at least in theory) to chance rather than function of the awfulness of
the crime and the depravity of the criminal.2° To be sure, the deatheligible class was not limitless - even then only those who committed
a fairly serious crime were considered. But it was not all that limited.
Worse, the next narrowing step followed no logic. As the Court would
put it later, at the stage of picking who among the death eligible
should actually die, the discretion of the jury was hardly
"channeled." 21
In Gregg, however, it appeared that the arbitrariness associated with
giving juries discretion over death was not beyond repair (something
that had been hinted at just a few years earlier in the Court's
McGautha opinion 22). In fact, the cure was a relatively simple formula:
agree on "aggravating factors" for the juries to review, have the juries
weigh those against possible mitigating factors, and then institute
some form of appellate review. If states passed a "carefully drafted
statute" that "ensure[d] that the sentencing authority" was "given
adequate information and guidance" then the arbitrariness worry
could be kept at bay. 23

kidnapping were authorized and more than occasionally imposed. The Court recently
has categorically excluded juveniles and offenders with mental retardation from the
ambit of the death penalty.") (footnote omitted).
20 Stewart famously compared it to the odds of being struck by lightning. See id. at 309.
21 See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("The use of
'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing
the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion.").
22 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). McGautlta had concluded that
channeling jury discretion was a hopeless endeavor:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and
their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by
the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present
human ability.
Id. at 204.
23

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3, 19S (1976). The full quotation reads:

In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given
adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these
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There were some catches, however. The most relevant of which (for
our purposes) was that if the aggravating factor was not narrow
enough, it required further limiting construction. A statute that
allowed the death penalty for every "heinous" murder would not
channel the jury's discretion because any murder could fit under the
category of being heinous, at least if "heinousness" was not carefully
circumscribed. The purpose of having aggravators was to limit
discretion, not to provide a mechanism for it. The Court flagged the
issue in Gregg, and noted also the solution. If a particular aggravating
factor was too "vague" or "broad," then the state courts must provide a
limiting construction to use the aggravator. If the state court failed to
do so, any death penalty sentence based on that factor risked being
reversed. 24
From this basis in Gregg, the Hidalgo petition gets its foothold.
According to Gregg, an aggravating factor by itself could fail to limit
those eligible for the death penalty, and later cases affirmed this
proposition. But so too, runs the argument in the Hidalgo petition,
could a sentencing scheme that has too many aggravators. If every
murder that comes down the pipe fits any of the many aggravating
factors the state has set up, then every murderer becomes eligible for
death. 25 It is the broad and vague aggravator problem in a slightly
different guise. The problem with a broad aggravator is that any
murder can fit it and thus it serves no limiting function. 26 Similarly, a
long list of aggravating factors also fails to limit discretion if every
murder can be matched up with at least one of the aggravating factors.
concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding
at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to
the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of
the information.

Id.

24 See id. at 201.
25 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 16 ("Thus, by the State's
own lights, the constitutionality of Arizona's sentencing scheme turns on whether the
aggravating circumstances 'impose statutory limits on capital sentencing discretion.'
Petitioner has demonstrated that they do not. Instead, they render 'virtually every'
defendant death eligible . . . . ").
26 See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) ("If the sentencer fairly
could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to eve,y defendant eligible
for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.") (emphasis in
original). I return to this passage later in the paper. See infra note 33 and
accompanying text.

UC Davis Law Review Online

56

[Vol. 51:49

This, according to petitioners, is what happens in Arizona.27
According to the petition, ninety-nine percent of the murders
committed in Arizona fit one or more of the fourteen aggravating
factors in the state's death penalty statute.28 But if all murders are
moved into the category of "murders eligible for the death penalty,"
then the scheme - taken as a whole rather than in regards to one
individual aggravator - fails to genuinely narrow. 29 In other words,
under this sentencing scheme, all murderers in the state end up
deserving the death penalty. And this starts to look like the
fundamental flaw in Funnan.Jo
II.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE HIDALGO CERT. PETITION

Although seemingly compelling, the argument in the Hidalgo
petition suffers from a basic confusion about the role of aggravators in
limiting the class of those eligible for death. Consider a simple, and
admittedly hypothetical, sentencing scheme in the State of "Alpha."
Alpha's death penalty statute has only two aggravating factors. The
first aggravator is that the murder is of more than twenty-seven
people. The second aggravator is that the murder must have been
preceded by at least three weeks of torture and severe psychological
abuse of the victim. Suppose that all sixty-eight3 1 of the murders that
take place within the State of Alpha are precisely these two types.
Here, just like the situation in Arizona, the aggravators are not
genuinely narrowing criminals eligible for death. All sixty-eight
murders - one hundred percent - are covered by one of the two
aggravators. The same objection lodged in the Hidalgo petition would
seem to apply: the aggravators are not performing any real narrowing
work because it turns out that all murders in the State of Alpha are
21 See Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 12 ("The Arizona Supreme
Court has disregarded that bedrock requirement of the Eighth Amendment, upholding
the constitutionality of a capital punishment scheme that renders 'virtually every'
defendant convicted of first-degree murder eligible for the death penalty.").
28 Id. at 3.
29 See id. at 12 ("Petitioner in this case set out evidence demonstrating that the
aggravating circumstances serve no narrowing function at all because 'virtually every
first degree murder case in Arizona presents facts that could support at least one of the
legislature's aggravating circumstances."').
JO See id. at 12-13 ("That holding [that Arizona's scheme is constitutional) is
plainly incompatible with this Court's insistence that a statutory scheme must limit
the class of death-eligible defendants.") (emphasis in original).
31 It does not really matter how many murders there were, but let us say there
were sixty-eight.
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death eligible. According to the Hidalgo petition, the State of Alpha's
sentencing scheme should be unconstitutional.
This is an absurd result, and it is a function of the fact that the
"narrowing" requirement is capable of two interpretations; one of
which is more plausible than the other. The Hidalgo petition trades on
this ambiguity by presenting the weaker reading of this requirement as
the correct one. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that an
"aggravating circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted
of murder." Rather, "it must apply only to a subclass of defendants
convicted of murder. "32 Applied to a scheme as a whole, this would be
problematic if a scheme had a list of aggravators that applied to "every
defendant convicted of a murder. "33 Or consider what the Court said
in Arave regarding when an aggravating circumstance would not pass
a constitutional muster: "If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. "34 Reading
this passage, one might conclude that if a list of aggravators applied to
every defendant eligible for the death penalty, then taken as a whole
that list would be "constitutionally infirm" as well.
Under the weak reading of the narrowing requirement, the class of
the death eligible is sufficiently "narrowed" when the number of
death-eligible murderers is less than the total number of murderers in
the state. I will call this weak reading an "empirical" reading of the
narrowing requirement. This empirical reading interprets the
narrowing requirement as a matter of sheer numbers. Applying this to
the State of Alpha example, if the number of those who are death
eligible is the same as all murders, then no real narrowing work has
been done by the set of aggravators. That is, the State of Alpha's
scheme fails because the number of murderers eligible for death and
the total number of murderers are the same. As no empirical or
numerical narrowing has been done, according to the Hidalgo petition,
this scheme would be unconstitutional.
A better reading of the narrowing requirement, however, would find
the State of Alpha's scheme constitutional. As a conceptual matter, the
number of possible murderers that are death eligible are in fact
narrowed down, and quite considerably. I will call this reading the
"conceptual" reading because as a conceptual matter not all alleged
murderers in Alpha are in fact eligible for the death penalty. Applying
32 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (citing Arave v. Creech, 507
U.S. 463,474 (1993)).
33 Cd.
34 Arave, 507 U.S. at 474 (emphasis in original).
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the State of Alpha example, if you shoot just two people without
torturing them, and even if you shoot more than five people whom
you torture for five days, you are not eligible for the death penalty in
Alpha. The class of murderers eligible for death in theory is quite
small in Alpha. It just so happens that Alpha has gone through a
terrible stretch, where all the murders have been of an especially
gruesome sort. As it turns out, the class of murderers and the class of
death-eligible murderers are coextensive. But relying on the empirical
number says nothing about whether real narrowing has occurred at the
conceptual level because it would seem obvious that it has occurred.
The argument raised in the Hidalgo petition ignores this possibility,
or at least glosses over it. Under the narrowing requirement in the
context of Gregg and its progeny, states must provide a sound basis to
categorize certain murders as worse than others. 35 This differs from
what the Hidalgo petitioners argue. While they show that in parts of
Arizona, every murder that happened fits one of the aggravated
factors, this does not mean that no narrowing has been done by that
state's aggravators. It could be, after all, that we are living in a state
like the State of Alpha, where all two of the aggravators are providing a
conceptual basis for narrowing the class of death-eligible murderers,
even when all actual murders fit those two aggravators. 36

J5 The Arave passage in context says this:
If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance
applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is
constitutionally infirm. See Cartw1ight, supra, 486 U.S., at 364, 108 S.Ct., at
1859 (invalidating aggravating circumstance that "an ordinary person could
honestly believe" described every murder); Godfrey, supra, 446 U.S., at 428429, 100 S.Ct., at 1765 ("A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly
characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman" ' ).
Id. Note how the requirement is that the aggravator in principle describe every murder,

not just that it describe every person who has murdered in that state.
J6 Moreover, I take it that the narrowing requirement would rule out - and I am
indebted to Stephen Galoob for this point - a scheme which "narrowed" the number
of death eligible by some principle such as "every seventh murderer is death eligible"
or "every murderer who kills on Tuesdays" is death eligible. These aggravators would
narrow, but not in a rational way. I am assuming that the State of Alpha's scheme
meets this test of rational narrowing: it may be extreme, but we should not doubt
either that multiple murders or torturing before murder would make a murder
distinguishable from the mine-run of murders.
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THE WAY FORWARD

The Hidalgo petition ironically comes close to realizing the
confusion I have just identified when it gives an example similar to the
one about the State of Alpha. 37 In response to the Arizona Supreme
Court's opinion in Hidalgo that it was enough that the individual
aggravators applied to "fewer than all murders," the petition argues
that, "under that logic, a State would be free to adopt two aggravators:
one that covers all murders with a particular feature, and the other
that covers all murders that lacll the particular feature. "38 This, indeed,
is a variation on the State of Alpha example, but obviously with one
important difference - the State of Alpha's aggravators seemed to
cover only a very small class of murders. It just turned out that all the
murders in Alpha that year happened to fit into that small class. Thus,
the aggravators conceptually but not numerically narrowed the deatheligible murderers. On the other hand, two aggravators in the Hidalgo
petition's example conceptually cover all murders. But this argument
differs from the claim that all murderers fit under one of Arizona's
aggravating factors. 39 Instead, the Hidalgo petition example suggests
that the aggravators in A1izona are so broad that they conceptually
"cover the field," meaning they encompass all possible murders. 40
A state like the one imagined in the petitioner's brief - which had
two aggravators that covered the field of all possible murders - would
likely have a problem under Godfrey. It is the same problem of having
a vague and overbroad aggravator, but divided in two. Each aggravator
would be too broad on its own. Further, if they, when taken together,
37 See supra Part 11.
38 Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 14-15 (emphasis in original).
39 This is true despite what the Petition seems to suggest, as in this passage:
But under that logic, a State would be free to adopt two aggravators: one that
covers all murders with a particular feature, and the other that covers all
murders that lack the particular feature. Or - as Arizona has done here - it
could adopt a long list of aggravators such that every convicted murderer is
somehow made eligible for death. Either system utterly fails to offer a
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which death is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not.
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)).
o For example, you could imagine distinct aggravators for murders that involved
the killing of: (1) police officers, (2) firefighters, (3) judges, and (4) potential
witnesses. These would all pick out murders that are distinct from so-called
"ordinary" murders, but unless we had a statute that picked out eve1y type of
employment (and unemployment), the class of the death-eligible would not become
coextensive with the class of all murderers.
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covered conceptually all possible murders, then the whole scheme
would certainly have a problem under Gregg and related cases.41
But the Hidalgo petition has failed to show that the many
aggravating factors in Arizona add up to something that "covers the
field" and makes all murderers, as a conceptual matter, eligible for
death. Instead, it engages in the weak, or empirical, reading of the
narrowing requirement that I noted above: because all murders match
an aggravator, all murderers are eligible for death. This is true as a
matter of empirical fact, but not as a conceptual truth. The conceptual
truth requires us to look at what the aggravators do individually. Only
then can we see whether, when taken altogether, they cover the field
of all possible murders and the scheme as a whole serves a narrowing
function. I am skeptical that this latter possibility is actually the case
in Arizona, or anywhere else. One could imagine a scheme that has
hundreds of aggravators, but that still comes nowhere close to
covering the field for all possible murders. 42
Running a successful and sound Hidalgo-type argument would not
involve any empirical investigation as to how many murders fell under
the existing aggravating factors. This is not the limiting function that
the Court has indicated it requires of aggravating factors. And as the
State of Alpha hy p othetical shows, it should strike us as clearly the
wrong kind of limiting. The scheme could conceptually limit the
death-eligible murders to a great degree without empirically narrowing
the number of the murders.
By contrast, a successful and sound Hidalgo-ty p e argument would
build on Godfrey, not depart from it. It would look at the aggravators
arid see, when taken together, whether they conceptually include all
murders. Suppose a scheme had an aggravator that included murders
"out in the open" and suppose it also had an aggravator that included
"concealed" killings. 43 Here, we have a facially plausible claim that the
41 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976) (stating that the Court will look
at the "sentencing system as a whole"); see also Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note
11, at 15 (calling this approach "holistic"). This is one definite contribution of the
petition, in that it urges a look at how the aggravators work together. My concern is
that the petition does not go far enough in showing a real constitutional problem with
these schemes when taken as a whole.
42 Again, this shows why we cannot simply say in the abstract that there are too
many aggravators without looking to see what those aggravators cover. Without looking
at the content of the aggravators, w e are left with the question raised in the quotation that
opens my essay, viz., when w e get to the point of "too many aggravators." I return to this
point in my conclusion. See also supra example in note 40.
43 I owe this example to Joe Welling.
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sentencing scheme leaves no murders out.44 This is not a matter of
empirical fact: we do not need to look at the murders that happened to
determine if the aggravators would cover all murders. Instead, it is a
matter of the concepts, now not only scrutinized individually, but also
taken as a whole.45
Thus, I propose that to determine if a group of aggravators taken as
a whole "covers the field," we must first look at the aggravators one by
one to see if each factor is too broad, and then take them together to
see if it conceptually narrows the class of those eligible for death.
When taken as a whole, courts must consider whether they narrow the
class of murderers who are death eligible beyond the "ordinary"
murder, not whether the aggravators in fact cover all the murders for a
given period of time. As the Court has made clear, "ordinary" is not
defined statistically, but conceptually as a murder that only involves
+! Justice Blackmun attempts just such an argument about the California death
penalty sentencing scheme in his dissent in Tuilaepa (which I quote at length):
Prosecutors have argued, and jurors are free to find, that "circumstances of
the crime" constitutes an aggravating factor because the defendant killed the
victim for some purportedly aggravating motive, such as money, or because
the defendant killed the victim for no motive at all; because the defendant
killed in cold blood, or in hot blood; because the defendant attempted to
conceal his crime, or made no attempt to conceal it; because the defendant
made the victim endure the terror of anticipating a violent death, or because
the defendant killed without any warning; and because the defendant had a
prior relationship with the victim, or because the victim was a complete
stranger. Similarly, prosecutors have argued, and juries are free to find, that
the age of the victim was an aggravating circumstance because the victim
was a child, an adolescent, a young adult, in the prime of life, or elderly; or
that the method of killing was aggravating, because the victim was strangled,
bludgeoned, shot, stabbed, or consumed by fire; or that the location of the
killing was an aggravating factor, because the victim was killed in her own
home, in a public bar, in a city park, or in a remote location.
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 96 7, 986-88 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). I leave
it open whether Justice Blackmun's argument works (that he correctly describes all
the aggravators in the scheme, and in fact the aggravators taken together "cover the
field," etc.). My point only is: it is the right kind of argument. Note that if Justice
Blackmun is right, it does not matter what kinds of murders are committed in
California in any given year, or even ever. We just need to look, conceptually, at what
aggravators there are and how they work together.
45 Of course, this does not conflict with also pursuing the Godfrey case for
individual aggravators, viz., that some aggravators are too broad taken by themselves.
However, the meaning of "broad" is unclear given the limited number of cases on this
issue, except when the aggravator selects all murders as death eligible. See supra note
8 and accompanying text. It is also consistent with attacking individual aggravators as
not picking out a feature that plausibly makes a murder one of the worst of the worst.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the unjustified killing of another person, stripped of any aggravators
that pick out that killing as special or especially bad. 46
Unconstitutional aggravators will fail to narrow the class of the
death eligible either individually - this is what happens in the nonlimited version of the "heinous" aggravator - or when taken as a
whole - this is what might happen if two or more aggravators covered
the field to include all murders. Both are part of the death penalty
opponents' original strategy except that the latter applies to the
scheme as a whole. The upshot of successful argument under either
strategy is the same. The scheme does not narrow because it fails to
select those murders that are worse than what all murders share
conceptually - the unjustified killing of another person. Such a
scheme would be "constitutionally infirm," not under the novel (and
flawed) argument in the Hidalgo petition, but under the original
argument set forth in Godfrey.
CONCLUSION

Posed in the abstract, "How many aggravators is too many?" has no
clear answer. We can, however, identify two possible ways of
answering this question. First, any aggravator is one too many if that
aggravator does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers to
less than the class of murderers taken as a whole. In other words, a
state must show how this murderer is worse than every other
murderer convicted in that state. The Court pointed out this problem
in Godfrey. Second, any group of aggravators may be found
unconstitutional if that group makes up a scheme where every
possible murderer is death eligible. In other words, if any murder
always has an aggravator that matches it, then the scheme
conceptually covers all possible murders.
This second answer is the constitutional problem that the Hidalgo
petition gestures at, but does not fully establish. For both of these
kinds of answers, the problem is not ultimately one of numbers.
Neither case against aggravating factors can be made by merely
showing that a lot or even all murders in a state matches an

6 As the Arizona Supreme Court put it, the idea is to guarantee that "no
defendant will be subject to a death sentence merely by virtue of being found guilty of
first degree murder . . . . " Arizona v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 791 (Ariz. 2017); see also
Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416 (1982) ("The existence of one or more
aggravating circumstances is a threshold finding that authorizes the jury to consider
imposing the death penalty; it serves as a bridge that takes the jury from the general
class of all murders to the narrower class of offenses the state legislature has
determined warrant the death penalty.").
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aggravator. The case that an aggravator or a scheme of aggravators is
too broad and captures too many murderers can only be made by
looking at what the aggravator or aggravators conceptually cover taken singly, or taken as a whole. It is in making this kind of case that
we might be able to fulfill the promise of the Hidalgo petition.

